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From early romanticism to more recent post-structuralist and postcolonial studies, all the possibilities and impossibilities that are
inherent in translation have fueled debate about authorship, intent,
readership, functional equivalence, worldview, the building of
national literatures, power differentials, ethics, and gender issues—
among many other topics—and, of course, about the nature of
“meaning” as the alleged sole legal tender of “all things translation.”
However, translation has less often been scrutinized as a form of
rhetorical transaction; fundamentally, all translations are attempts,
in and of themselves, to persuade their readership of some degree
of correspondence with their source. They have also been seen as
covertly phatic texts; they call the audience’s attention to the
existence of another text that translation identifies, mimics,
annihilates, and resurrects. Translations advertise the existence of a
text by, paradoxically, causing it to “disappear” in its original form
and then by taking over its identity; a translation is the very illusion
of reading Dostoyevsky or Borges while actually not doing so.
However, the relationship between translation and rhetoric
surpasses this ontological threshold of persuasion, by which readers
of translations are prone to be persuaded of clean equivalence
between texts.
In this paper I demonstrate how systematic inclusion of
rhetoric-centered approaches in translation studies, and vice versa,
would not only cross-fertilize these two fields, but would also help
shed light on some areas where a monolingual focus has all too
often imposed significant limitations on progress. First, I will
suggest an ad hoc selection of classical and modern approaches to
rhetoric and will reflect on their correspondence (or lack of it) with
the scant focus that translation studies has placed on rhetoric. In
the second section, I will provide a quick overview of what I define
as a “rhetoric of meaning in translation studies.” There I will
discuss how some of the core notions in translation theory are

significantly mediated by assumptions about meaning and language
that cannot escape a degree of servitude to specific epistemological
rhetoric(s). These tend either to underestimate or overgeneralize
the effect of rhetoric within texts being translated.
In the third section of this paper, I will explore potential
disciplinary concurrences through the field of comparative rhetoric
in order to establish a basis for the translation of rhetorical devices
that is not constricted solely by source language-dictated features.
Finally, the discussion will turn in the fourth and last section to
comparing how the study of rhetorical correspondence at the micro
level in source and target languages and texts may be substantially
hindered by significant structural disparities at the macro level that
may not have been systematically or successfully incorporated into
the wider theoretical framework of translation studies. I will
provide specific examples and analyses illustrating these disparities
in order to suggest potential avenues for further research
incorporating rhetoric-centered approaches to translation studies.

Ad Hoc Definitions of Rhetoric for Translation
Purposes
In this section, I will summarily explore a number of theoretical
stances in the field of rhetoric that would seem to impinge on
translation and translation theory. An apology is due in the first
place to scholars and experts in the field of rhetoric for the
necessarily fragmentary nature of this section. In an attempt to
provide an overview of a series of notions from a field that has been
visited only occasionally and with more or less success by
translation studies in the last few decades, the following wideranging review of concepts and schools of thought is bound to be
perceived as hasty and sketchy. Well-versed scholars might
rightfully claim an indiscriminate mix of areas, and perhaps even of
reciprocally excluding theoretical paradigms.
Captatio benevolentiae aside, discourse in translation theory
has indeed been permeated throughout the centuries by a
defensive, apologetic tenor even in some of the classical texts in the
discipline, such as Hieronymus’s and Martin Luther’s defenses of
their translational strategies in their renditions of the Bible. In
more recent times, it is not uncommon for seminal texts in the
discipline to start out as overtly apologetic infringements into the
territory of other fields or aggressive intrusions from other
disciplines. Translation studies is an intrinsically interdisciplinary
and sometimes also multidisciplinary field. It is inherently inclined
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to embark on excursions beyond its perceived boundaries and to
carry about incursions into remote fields. Like translation itself,
translation studies tend not to be the center of things, but more
often to be between things: between cultures, between languages,
between peoples, between disciplines and intellectual paradigms—
always between, never the center. The “in-between” is thus a
frequent metaphorical denomination for the members of the
translation and interpreting community that could very well apply
to their disciplinary counterparts in academia (Pym, 2012, 13-35).
As a relatively new field of scholarship, translation and
interpreting studies has an intrinsic need to draw from wellestablished fields, linguistics, cultural studies, psycholinguistics,
anthropology, pragmatics, literary studies, second language
acquisition, comparative grammar, terminology, lexicography, and
philosophy among others. This seems connatural to the field’s
ability to develop and grow as an academic discipline and area of
inquiry beyond the plane of professional education (commonly and
misleadingly known as “translator and interpreter training”). The
only possible regret in such radical interdisciplinarity may be the
inexplicable neglect of visiting other, perhaps closer, familiar and
compatible grounds. Rhetoric and translation studies have
regrettably been one of those “reciprocally ignorant neighbors.”
During nearly perfect decade-based progressions, and almost in
Kuhnian terms, epistemological paradigms in translation studies
have been explored, never completely exploited, and often rendered
passé by subsequent “incommensurable” and sometimes selfexcluding disciplinary turns (Pym, 2010). Within that relentless
forward movement, however, as the next section will show, efforts
in translation studies and translation theory have swung—
pendulously or decidedly—between micro-textual frontal-assault
tactics and macro-textual overarching envelopments in a way that
is reminiscent of the “big rhetoric” vs. “little rhetoric” debate, by
which rhetoric as a discipline debated whether it should be entitled
to push the envelope of its traditional limits and make inroads into
the epistemic questioning of other disciplines (Ingraham, 2015, 8).
In a similar way, epistemological shifts in translation studies have
taken the discipline from operating at close quarters with linguistics
into testing itself against the grain of historic, cultural, sociological,
and cognitive considerations. This pendulum-like movement has
been characterized by Umberto Eco as a debate between the
skeptical-holistic argument and the postulate of a perfect language
(Eco, 2001, 220-221). The first pole focuses on the impossibilities of
translation and is typically instantiated as a belligerent revisionism
about long-accepted “commonsensical” assertions about
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translation. Almost as militantly, the second argument rejoices in
descriptively mapping or prescriptively educating about all the
possibilities that translation entails.
The secular assumption that “translation is about meaning”—
and its epistemological nemesis, in which “translation is a matter
that undermines the notion of meaning,” may be a convenient
starting point in the search for areas of convergence between both
disciplines. The link between meaning and rhetoric has been
described by the American literary theorist Kenneth Burke as
follows: “Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And
wherever there is ‘meaning’ there is persuasion” (Burke, 1969, 172).
Under this understanding, the dealings of translation with meaning
cannot ignore the deep impingements that both translation and
meaning have on rhetoric.
There is, however, a need to be selective in picking and choosing
useful theoretical frameworks and methodologies from different
disciplines (and not necessarily compatible ones in every case) that
one deems to be productive in one’s own field. An inclusive and
overarching definition of rhetoric—of contemporary rhetoric, that
is—would draw concurring viewpoints from authors such as
Burke—meaning is always persuaded (Burke, 1969)—or Friedrich
Nietzsche—language is always allegorical (Nietzsche, 1989, 23-25,
67). From a more modern approach, such as the multidisciplinary
one provided by semiotics, other authors have posited that rhetoric
functions as a repository of commonly accepted “truths” and that
rhetoric is pleasurable to the persuaded (Eco, 1999, 167-173;
Barthes, 1985, 132). From the field of linguistics or the related
subfields of pragmatics, philosophy of language, and comparative
rhetoric, language has been considered a form of energy (or
“perlocutionary force”) addressed to the goal of physically and/or
psychologically modifying the environment of the speaker (Austin,
1975; Nietzsche, 1989; Quine, 1960; Kennedy, 1998; Burke, 1965).
Such a selection of notions will lend itself to a more comfortable
alignment with one or more diametrically opposed paradigms in
translation studies. Consequently, the discipline has tended to
recruit a myriad of theoretical bodies to sustain its frequently
opposing causes and goals.
More culturally preoccupied, Eco also views rhetoric as a sort of
repository of “acquired formulas,” not just under the appearance of
rhetorical devices—which would be “linguistic techniques”—but
also a symbolic repository that sinks its roots into commonplaces
accepted by a community of speakers (Eco, 1999, 173). This
approach takes us back to Roland Barthes’s Mythologies, in which
the author views rhetoric as linked to ideological domination and to
José M. Dávila-Montes
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the imposition of constructs that pass themselves off as “natural”
and inevitable, or at least as “probable premises” (Barthes, 1970).
Consistent with a view that equates the symbolic with the
linguistic and thus the rhetorical, Burke states,
[…] rhetoric as such is not rooted in any past condition
of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of
language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is
continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic
means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature
respond to symbols (Burke, 1969, 43).
Burke’s observation suggests again that, at one extreme, meaning is
always persuaded. That is, it corresponds to an enlistment of the
persuader’s reasoning and the traditionally stable and obvious
referential value conferred on “Meaning”—with a capital “M”—and
therefore always depends on a purely dialectical question; it is
“meaning” for me precisely to the extent that it is meaning for
someone else. Meaning is not just established necessarily through
otherness, but is also defined in its nature as a struggle with the
other—and again, not just necessarily a cooperative struggle, as is
frequently purveyed by pragmatics.
Nietzsche refuted the autonomous nature of rhetoric, claiming
that its apparatus is merely a refinement that takes the basic
mechanisms of language themselves perpetually to the extreme,
departing in an endless motion from original referentiality—a longlost referentiality and, actually, a never truly existent one beyond
sheer contextual deixis:
The tropes, the nonliteral significations, are considered
the most artistic means of rhetoric. But, with respect to
their meanings, all words are tropes in themselves, and
from their very beginning. Instead of what truly takes
place, they represent a sound image, which fades away in
time (Nietzsche, 1989, 23).
For Nietzsche there is scant difference, if any, between words
proper and tropes, inasmuch as there is not much of a difference
between regular speech and the so-called rhetorical figures
(Nietzsche, 1989, 25).
For Nietzsche, and subsequently others, the formation of a
rhetorical expression is a question of power; as a violation of the
linguistic norm, it can be rejected as an error—and the speaker thus
perceived as incompetent—or can be welcomed as an innovation
and embraced, thereby becoming a new species of “rhetorical
device” that ultimately emerges from the authority that proposes it.
José M. Dávila-Montes
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The resonances of this stance with pragmatics and the notion of
“perlocutionary force” are hardly escapable. Also, the notion of
“violation of the norm” brings us closer to generally accepted
principles in more classical rhetorical terms (deviation or
markedness) that have left a significant footprint in translation
studies in the form of another classical binary confrontation in
translation theory: that of domesticating and foreignizing
translation.
How does translation transact with the fundamentally rhetorical
nature of text? If rhetoric binds to meaning and thus becomes a
meaning-making (i.e., cognitive) operation, what would be the
potential contribution of cognition-centered approaches the effects
that are activated by rhetorical devices in texts of various sorts?
How do such devices travel (or not travel) across languages and
worldviews when texts undergo translation? The traditional
dialectics of “lost and found in translation,” which are typically
focused at either a semantic or a referential level, is likely to be
insufficient to describe these complex processes in depth. Rhetoric
matters.

The Rhetoric of Meaning in Translation Studies
The discussion will turn here to reviewing how the history of
translation theory, and more recently, of translation studies as a
systematized field of inquiry, has been permeated by specific
conceptual paradigms and discourses, each with a rhetoric of their
own, that may paradoxically have evaded the importance of rhetoric
itself in the definition of their object of study. In that sense, the
conundrums listed in the previous section roughly outline the
struggle that translation studies confronts in establishing a
relationship vis-à-vis meaning, inasmuch as the long-standing
“token of truth” (translation as a successful or unsuccessful
transaction of meaning) frequently goes against the grain of
uncertainties about “the meaning of meaning.” The relativistic,
non-essentialist approach to meaning that contemporary rhetoric
also purveys has proved very fertile within a number of poststructuralist approaches to literary studies and translation studies.
However, this approach has frequently failed to move beyond the
stumbling block of a sterile debate about the possibility or
impossibility of translation (Dávila-Montes, 2012, 51). In moving
toward a complete incorporation of language into the realm of
rhetoric, a profound questioning of language’s strictly referential
function emerges, and therefore a rift gradually appears within the
notion of a “clean” referential value of meaning that is detached
José M. Dávila-Montes
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from interpersonal (intercultural and interlinguistic, in the case of
translation) power relations. Inevitably, a connection between
meaning and persuasion is again drawn, which would bring us to
the dialectical approach of Hegel—specifically to the master-slave
discourse—applied to the areas of study commonly known as
“translation and power” and “post-colonial translation studies.”
Let us first take a few steps back and survey what
correspondences or lack of it exist between the summary of
concepts listed above and the several attempts (rather indirect
ones, as we will see) that translation scholars have put forward in
order to benefit from the intellectual edifice of rhetoric in its
broadest possible definition. There is a whole, yet rather selective,
“rhetoric of meaning” in translation studies.
Contemporary translation studies began to consolidate as a
theoretical body in the 1950s, with efforts to tackle, sometimes
piecemeal, the singularities of translation: a communicational
activity with a history of several millennia that had, nevertheless, a
meager academic tradition outside the boundaries of what was
known as “grammar-translation” (or the use of translation as a
primitive language-acquisition tool). In an interconnected world,
with an increasing presence of translation as a respected
intellectual activity, and in the midst of the exultant parade of
scientific positivism of the mid-twentieth century, translation
scholars resorted to linguistics and to “microscope-like” approaches
to the object of their study in a way that may be comparable to what
has been described as “little rhetoric.” The misleadingly named
“stylistique comparée” inaugurated a tradition of language-pair
scrutiny of morphological, lexical, and syntactical correspondences
in an attempt to draw a meticulous map of the infinite spider’s web
of relationships spanning out from the minute comparison of
grammars and languages (Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958). Still
influenced by the heavy “grammar-translation” tradition, efforts
frequently came, almost inevitably, to anticlimactic screeching halts
when approaching the boundaries of the sentence, or the
paragraph, at the very most.
Still within “conventional” linguistics, but with a strong
generativist import, authors such as John Catford laid out in the
1960s and 70s the groundwork for mathematical, formula-like
abstractions that apparently elevated the previous head-to-head
comparisons to the stature of a—at least potentially—computerized
process (Catford, 2000 [1965]). From that point on, the influence of
computer-oriented thought in the development of translation
theories has periodically permeated advances in the practical
application of translation technologies, and also in the
José M. Dávila-Montes
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incorporation of statistical analysis in translation-oriented
research. To that era of definitional struggles belongs the
manifesto-like 1988 paper “The Name and Nature of Translation
Studies,” which notoriously claimed full-fledged status for the
discipline within the empirical sciences (Holmes, 2000).
Specific cultural preoccupations and advances in
communication studies had by then already overcome limitations
in the search for formal correspondence and had fueled
semantically based theories of dynamic equivalence, such as those
stemming from the works of Eugene Nida, or revolving around text
type and textual functions, e.g., Hans Vermeer’s skopos theory
(Nida, 1964; Schäffner, 2001). Pragmatics in general, and most
significantly, the notion of meaning as a social construct, such as in
Paul Grice’s theory of meaning or Dan Sperber and Deirdre
Wilson’s relevance theory, provided a foothold for a number of
theoretical “raids” from translation studies that brought home a
bounty of new directions in research, systemically washing out the
interest of previously accepted constructs that had enjoyed a
relatively prestigious status (Grice, 1957; Serber and Wilson, 1990).
From a purely textual approach, textual linguistics and
discourse analysis opened the door to a wave of yet wider text- and
ideology-based approaches in the 1990s, such as that of Basil Hatim
and Ian Mason (Hatim and Mason, 1990). Strong, pedagogically
and process-oriented research endeavors began to benefit from the
widespread use of computers by translators and from the ability to
register keystroke logs, record every operation conducted on the
screen, and even eye-track the gaze of the translating human,
guinea pig-like, subjects. Also, through corpus linguistics, the
statistical comparison of translations, their source texts, and nontranslated original texts has generated the ability to compile
massive occurrences at the micro level and to extrapolate them to
wider horizons. The rhetoric of translation studies adopted
discourses of broader scope, including some with universalist
claims and others with political and historical concerns. And yet,
many of the achievements of these empirically oriented
methodologies could not circumvent the epistemological
shortcoming of accepting the nature of meaning (whichever nature
of meaning) as a given, as a guaranteed starting point for every
construct to grow from. A robust rhetoric of empiricism in
translation studies seemed to have validated James Holmes’s claim
that, “Translation studies is, as no one I suppose would deny, an
empirical discipline” (Holmes, 2000, section 3.1).
From the opposite direction, in a way that might perhaps be
labeled “deductive” rather than “inductive,” Nietzsche’s equation of
José M. Dávila-Montes
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language and rhetoric and Jacques Derrida’s incursions into
translation from the fields of philosophy and literary criticism
fostered a school of thought in translation studies with strong ties
to deconstruction and social criticism (Derrida, 1985). The study of
power relations in translation and the history of translation as a
necessary participant in power dynamics provided fertile ground
for overarching discussions, somewhat close to the quarters of “big
rhetoric.” With a strong influence from Marxist and
psychoanalytical theories, objectivity of meaning is presented as
illusory and always subject to a set of social, interpersonal,
intercultural, political, and hegemonic factors. Thinkers such as
Walter Benjamin, Pierre Bourdieu, or Michel Foucault are invoked,
and discussion extends the epistemological preoccupations of
translation studies to areas that had traditionally belonged to
metaphysics, literary criticism, or sociological theory. With the
eminently symbolic value of language now a given, the definition of
translation is approached as a study of its metaphorics (St. André,
2010). Translation is considered a tool for unveiling the unstable
nature of meaning, as well as a “living proof” of epistemic
relativism, thus incorporating social and gender agendas, political
discourse, and literary activism. Significantly rooted in these
premises, a “cultural turn” in translation studies took place,
followed by a “sociological turn” in which meaning ceases to be the
unquestioned currency of every translational activity and in which
translation and its paradoxes become a battering ram against
conventional wisdom.
In a more cognitivist and constructivist vein, but drawing on
post-structuralist semiotics, translation is also seen as an
interlinguistic meaning-making process with a focus on interpretive
and authorial agency rather than on semantic transfer. Every
meaning-making operation is seen as the notional byproduct of a
perpetual process of symbolic action known as “semiosis,” by virtue
of which the endless substitution of a sign by another sign is
everything per se that meaning is: a dynamis of permanent
replacement of signs. Viewed in this light, translation is typically
heavily taxed on account of the expectation that it is a substitution
that does not substitute but equates (Dávila-Montes, 2012, 48-51).
In this approach translation can also be considered one of the
foremost examples of semiosis. A target text is a sign that replaces a
source text and signifies it, and therefore ascribes itself to the ranks
of meaning-making operations par excellence. In this light, then,
meaning ceases to be “the object” of translation, and translation
becomes the very essence of meaning.
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Comparative Rhetoric and Translation Studies: A
Detour of Meaning by Way of the Enthymeme’s
“Short-cut”
This section will examine areas of disciplinary concurrence in the
fields of translation studies and rhetoric, most specifically, in the
area of comparative rhetoric as a robust intersection between the
two. While translation traditionally needs to “mind” a wide array of
factors in order successfully to meet communicative expectations,
the study of disparate rhetorical practices in different cultures
and/or languages has not necessarily taken a center stage position
in translation studies, at least not in a clear, explicit way. This
section will therefore explore how the notion of “meaning-making”
as an object/goal of both communicative acts (translation and
rhetoric) can provide a solid ground for reciprocal disciplinary
growth. I will look into relatively recent meaning-oriented cognitive
approaches to rhetoric that consider it from a neurolinguistics
perspective. I will reflect on a specific rhetorical device, the
enthymeme: a pervasive mechanism in a myriad of languages and
rhetorical traditions, as an illustration of a potential comparative
basis for a systematic study of the translation of rhetoric.
Recent approaches to rhetoric have drawn from cognitive
science and cognitive linguistics, establishing—with strong and
frequently ignored psychoanalytical echoes—that the intrinsically
rhetorical nature of language mirrors the fundamental structure of
human cognition (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Neurolinguistics has
described “meaning” as dynamic neural connections between
different areas in the sensorimotor regions of the brain and the
regions in which subjective experience resides. In a manner that
recalls the same approach, contemporary psychoanalysis proposes
meaning as the unstable intersection between the imaginary and
symbolic orders of the human psyche (Librecht, 2001, 198). These
are, roughly in semiotic terms, the iconic and the symbolic, which
in turn can be seen as the activity happening in different regions of
the brain. In many instances, these approaches describe the
mechanisms of cognition as primarily metonymic—metonymy
understood as the trope of contiguity and displacement—or
metaphoric. Whereas metonymic connections relate notions in the
same domain or “cognitive space,” metaphoric connections (true
“new meaning”) relate notions “located” in different domains or
“cognitive spaces.” The connections between cognition/meaning
and language/rhetoric surface in a way that seems not just
narrative or pictorial—as in we need to use metaphors to talk about
language and cognition—but structural, telling us what language
and cognition are, as in tropes are the manifestation—in the
José M. Dávila-Montes
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‘material’ linguistic surface—of the very mechanisms of deeper
neural, and thus also material, activity.
There is a moderate claim to universalism in George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson, but in spite of their cautious hedging, the simple
fact that their proposals were initially posed within and stemmed
from research developed in a monolingual scientific paradigm (that
is, English-speaking academia) speaks volumes about the
epistemological limitations that these proposals are binding
themselves to, precisely when they are lucubrating about language
(and not just “one” language) and human cognition (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999, 284). It also speaks volumes about how much
translation studies may contribute to expanding and commenting
on the assertions that come out of these and similar theoretical
bodies regarding language and rhetoric. Nothing in the alleged
universalism of the above-mentioned theories or the notion of an
“embodied mind” contradicts the foreseeable possibility that
different cultures have developed different rhetorical/cognitive
refinements, or at least have privileged some mechanisms, whether
universal or not, above others (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
Translation has frequently been seen as a text about a text.
Within the functionalist school, for example, translations have been
seen as “[I]nformation… about information originally offered in
another language” (Schäffner, 1998, 236). Such information is
conveyed overtly or covertly (House, 1981). So, when we talk about
translations of advertising, for example, we consider persuasion to
be the desired effect of a metatext—a text about a text—to the extent
that it produces in the target audience “similar effects” to those of
the source text, most desirably in a “covert” fashion (i.e. not
revealing the fact that the target text is actually a translation).
These effects (or rhetorical value) are achieved by methods known
to be substantially different in disparate advertising environments
and linguistic traditions. It has been discussed by several studies
and language pairs for the translation of advertising: transporting
every single rhetorical or linguistic device from source to target,
even if it were to be syntactically possible, would likely be highly
unsuccessful in achieving such persuasive effects (Al-Shehari,
2004; Bueno García, 2000; Dávila-Montes, 2008; Guidère, 2000,
2001, 2003; Shakir 1995; Torresi, 2010; Valdés Rodríguez, 2004).
In more general terms, conventional wisdom in translation
practices has long established that perfectly valid and viable
microstructures in both the source and target languages can be
carried over from one to the other every time they appear in a text
and still produce highly unnatural renditions from the wider
perspective of a macro-textual approach.

José M. Dávila-Montes
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The question, then, is: Does a given tolerated violation of the
norm as a rhetorical principle work the same way in different
languages and cultures? The answer, well-known in both
translation studies and comparative rhetoric, is “no.” The supposed
basic rhetorical principle that equates rhetoric instantiations to
tolerated violations of a norm might vary considerably in the degree
(or direction) of transgression within different linguistic traditions.
Moreover, it may vary in the level of tolerance for violations or
types of violations, or even in the very “normality” (or frequency) of
the norm.
As described in the previous section, the Western tradition in
translation theory has provided ample focus on contrastive
approaches by establishing systematic comparisons between
languages at the grammatical levels (lexical, morphological, and
syntactic) and has made inroads in comparative discourse analysis
and even in incorporating non-traditional grammars into its
methodologies, such as Michael Halliday’s systemic functional
grammar. Thus, multiple efforts have been dedicated to languagepair-based studies (Pym, 2016). However, these studies are all too
often restricted in their range, or at least significantly restricted in
their scope, sometimes because of the very nature of their
grammatical meta-language, which is usually based on Westernlanguage grammars (Niranjana, 1992, 34-35), and hence on the
Latin tradition from which they stem (Dons, 1971). At the macro
level, discourse analysis has frequently stumbled on the specificity
of case-based studies, or on the implied ethnocentricity of Robert
Kaplan’s “cultural thought patterns” (Kaplan, 1966). Muriel SavilleTroike cautions against falling into a biased “ethnocentric labeling”
when attempting to comparatively describe syntax, discourse, and
rhetorical devices as cultural artifacts (Saville-Troike, 2002, 151153). Nonetheless, comparative rhetoric, viewed as the comparison
of rhetorical strategies in different languages, is now a severaldecades-old discipline. Contrastive studies, bound as they are by
the very nature of the object they endeavor to study (language) and
by the main tool used to achieve such an endeavor (also language),
typically find their most productive expressions inductively,
working upward from case studies and resorting to the one
legitimate tool within its epistemological limits: proof by contrast.
While such contrapositions may have merit and import when
contrasting relatively close languages (since degrees of possible
correspondence can be frequently found at many grammatical and
sometimes morphological levels), a contrastive comparison of
languages belonging to more distant phyla becomes increasingly
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difficult, if not at times utterly pointless (Dávila-Montes, 2008,
491-493).
The alleged universalism of some of the rhetorical stances
described in the previous pages may suggest that a comparison of
rhetorical strategies and their frequencies can provide a more evenhanded basis for contrastive or comparative studies of languages,
and hence for the study of translations between specific language
pairs. Within the field of comparative rhetoric, George A. Kennedy
presents an interesting study of a number of aspects of oratory and
rhetoric in ancient China—and in other eras and civilizations—in
comparison with the Classical Greek tradition. He found that
although persuasive Chinese political discourse has a macro-textual
structure similar to the Western one—introduction, narrative,
argument, and conclusion—it is, nonetheless, based on different
values (Kennedy, 1998, 141-166). Classical Chinese rhetoric avoids
emotive exhortation (pathos) and relies on the authority of the
orator as an argument in itself (ethos). According to Kennedy,
discursive brilliance in the Chinese tradition submits to the
supremacy of honesty and sincerity; logical argumentation is
mostly inductive in nature, while deductive argumentation is
relegated to a secondary position and is mainly enthymemic in form
(Kennedy, 1998, 151). The “secondary role” that Kennedy identifies
in enthymemes within the Chinese rhetorical tradition poses a
substantial contradiction to the central function of enthymemes in
Western rhetoric, which I will discuss in the following paragraphs.
Let us scrutinize enthymemes as rhetorical devices identified in
a wide range of very disparate languages in an attempt to unveil the
reason for their potentially across-the-board validity as a cognitive
operation. Barthes, following Aristotle, established that enthymemes are a rhetorical device eminently based on identification
and articulated according to a principle of verisimilitude or
plausibility of premises; an enthymeme is defined as being an
incomplete syllogism (Barthes, 1985, 130-1). The enthymeme is said
to be “a more economical discourse that appeals to the intelligence
of the recipient” and implicitly invites him or her to fill in meaning
(Beristáin, 2006, 173, my translation).
The classic example of the enthymeme is reduced to the famous
expression, “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Socrates is
mortal.” Yet an “incomplete” expression of this syllogism implies
participation on the part of the receiver: “All men are mortal so
Socrates is mortal.” That Socrates is a man is understood.
Enthymemes, by omitting one of the premises of the syllogism,
appeal to what already exists—that is, to identification. However, in
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regard to their theme/rheme structure, enthymemes propose a
topic that is accepted by consensus: “All men are mortal.”
The enthymeme’s destination (new information) is the
conclusion—“Socrates is mortal”—but it may or may not imply
information that is truly new for the recipient. Whether it does or
not is not necessarily relevant to the persuasive process since, new
or old, the information must be turned into “persuaded” meaning;
strictly speaking, it is a matter not of contributing new information,
but of convincing the audience of the soundness of that
information, regardless of whether it is new or old. What, then, has
taken place between premise and conclusion? Apparently nothing,
as the second term of the syllogism is omitted. Yet it is precisely this
omission that is the key to the enthymeme’s persuasive process. It
identifies “A” (mortality) with “C” (Socrates) by virtue of “B”
(Socrates is a man) but without going through “B”—omitting that
step. So what happens with “B”? It is left in the hands of the
listener. In pragmatic terms, this is a sort of “implicature,” but
semiotically speaking, the listener is charged with the responsibility
of “reconstructing” the syllogism, and he or she is invited to
establish a relationship—or, as Lakoff and Johnson express it, to
establish a [metaphorical] connection—between two elements from
different areas (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
The connection created is not a real connection but a
simulacrum of one. If we said, “All cats are mortal, and therefore
Socrates is mortal,” the implicature would be that Socrates is a
feline. In that case, an authentic connection between two initially
separate pieces of information would be produced: “The speaker
owns or knows of a cat that happens to share its name with the
Greek philosopher.” Although the premise omitted in the original
enthymeme (“Socrates is a man”) already exists as this second
premise (“B”), it is omitted precisely because it is taken as a
“probable premise” or “consensus truth.” Thus, the enthymeme
triggers the mechanism of the metaphorical connection between
two regions that are, in fact, already connected from the beginning:
“man” and “Socrates.” It becomes a sort of false activation of the
cognitive mechanism; the mechanism is in fact produced—the
listener must make the connection for the syllogism to work—and
yet it is produced with elements that are already connected
beforehand—that is, with elements that are already identified with
each other. Cognitively speaking, we could say that enthymemes
attempt to demonstrate movement by revving up the engine of a car
that has no wheels and has already arrived at its destination. The
enthymeme’s persuasive efficacy comes from its ability to
incorporate in a single rhetorical device both metaphorical and
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metonymic functions—that is, the symbolic and the iconic
intersecting: meaning. This does not mean that an enthymeme
should be articulated based on what is called, strictu sensu,
“metaphor” or “metonymy”; there is very little metaphor in “All
men are mortal.” Quite the contrary, we are speaking of
metaphorical and metonymic “cognitive functions.” It is from the
intersection of those functions that meaning is produced. The trick
is that “meaning” was already there; enthymemes just pull the
rabbit out of an “empty hat full of rabbits.” Moreover, this trick is
re-enacted in a multiplicity of languages, as we will see next.
As opposed to the lack of fit in the array and assembly of
rhetorical devices within discourse that Kennedy purports reveal at
the macro level, at the micro level the apparently universal fit of
some structures would, perhaps, help to pinpoint common
correspondences between languages that are typically translated
without much of a thought: that is, with an effortless assumption of
neat, equivalent correspondence in their rhetorical efficacy
(Kennedy, 1998). A more specific example is the Latin construction
“non solum […] sed etiam […]” (not only A but also B). The
structure is similar to that of the enthymeme, except that the
second premise is made explicit through a double negative (“not”
and “only”) that first cancels and then activates it. “Only” has
negational value because “only A” implies “not C, nor D … nor X,
nor Y, nor Z,” only “A.”
Through the construction “non solum A sed etiam B,” “B” is
communicated, but the objective is in fact to reinforce the validity
of A. Thus, in saying that a car is “not only fast but also fuel
efficient,” the efficiency argument, whether true or not, has an
initial informational value, but it is the speed argument that is
inherently persuasive because it instills in the receiver a metaimplicature: “the speed of this vehicle is a given.” It is a “metaimplicature” because what is omitted is not necessarily objective
information (the speediness of the car, which is explicitly stated)
but information on how to interpret that information (“this
vehicle’s speed is a given, and you ought to accept it, too. I am
talking from authority and thus you are accepting not just the
information about the speed, but my authority”).
The double negative presents the information in such a way that
an immediate identification must be established: “Not only is it
fast” implies “I know that you already know it is fast.” The listener
may not already be aware of this particular vehicle’s velocity-related
virtues, but in presenting the information in this way, persuaders
create a dynamic of “it is a fact known to all; you had better believe
it, too. Socrates is a man, and this car is fast.” The expression is
José M. Dávila-Montes
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found in a wide range of languages within a varied number of
families, including Romance (Italian: non solo ma anche; Spanish:
no sólo sino también; Catalan: no només sinó també; French: non
seulement mais encore); Anglogermanic (English: not only … but
also…; German: nicht nur sondern auch), and also Semitic (Arabic:
), Indo-Iranian (Persian:
), Kurdish (
), Altaic (Turkish: na bas lakin ham), Ural-Altaic
(Japanese: だけじゃなくて – … dake ja nakute), or Sino-Tibetan
(Chinese: 不仅 … 而且… – bujin … erquie, or already in the Classical
period before the introduction of Western-inspired forms: 不唯 ...
而 – bù wéi ... ér; or 不獨 ... 而 – bù dú ... ér).1
In addition, the etymological distance between the words in the
phrase, even among closely related languages such as the Romance
family, seems to reinforce the idea that these linguistic
constructions are not a matter of a simple linguistic idiom. If it
were so, there would be more similarity in the etymology of the
logical positions they occupy. On the contrary, and very much as
with enthymemes, it seems that this expression is a sort of
persuasive cognitive “automatism” triggered by the invocation of
the previously mentioned principles. Even in the unlikely case that
this structure has been systematically transferred between such a
range of cultures and languages through influences or translations,
the fact that an expression with such a relatively complex logical
structure (negation + element of exclusivity + adversative particle +
emphatic affirmation) is commonly used in so many languages as a
persuasive device is clearly relevant because of its demonstrated
enticement power and because of the fact that it can point toward
fundamental cognitive structures.
The question that arises from these premises (existence of
enthymemes in a given language pair and different values of
enthymemes in the two rhetorical traditions) seems inevitable:
They can obviously be translated. But when must they be?

Translated Rhetoric: From Particular Differences
to Far-Flung Limits
The discussion in this section will turn to outlining plausible
approaches to the translation of rhetorical devices within texts
I thank Drs. Alexander Dawoody (for Turkish, Arabic, Kurdish, and
Farsi), Sara Rovira (Chinese), and Anne Helene Suárez (Chinese) for this
information.
1
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belonging to two different rhetorical traditions, paying close
attention to how the structural (grammatical) differences between
languages curtail a viable transaction of all possible rhetorical
devices in a text. I will also consider briefly the effect of the
opposite circumstance: when all rhetorical devices in a segment can
(grammatically) be translated into the target text. I contend that a
mapping of rhetorical-cultural values may be the primary
requirement in attempting to answer the question of when a
rhetorical device that exists in both languages (target and source)
can be reasonably translated or, perhaps, when it rather should not
be.
Cultural studies has proposed a wide classification of cultures
based on their enlistment on a Low Context Communication (LCC)
and High Context Communication (HCC) scale. David Katan
discusses Edward Hall’s theories on the different relationships with
context found across cultures (Hall, 1983; Katan, 2004, 245-260).
In LCC, the communication process tends to take place with a
greater degree of contextual independence, whereas HCC more
fully incorporates contextual matters into discourse and behavior.
In ranking cultures typifying these parameters (which Katan cites
from other authors, claiming that they do not correspond to any
other statistic he knows of [Katan, 2004, 253]) Swiss-German
culture would be positioned as the ultimate example of LCC, fitting
well “the stereotype of exacting precision and detailed information”
(Katan, 2004, 253), closely followed by German and Scandinavian
cultures. At the other extreme (HCC) is Japanese culture—
supposedly satisfying “our stereotype of their inscrutable culture”
(Katan, 2004, 253)—followed by Arabic and Latin American
cultures. Setting aside for the moment the element of cultural
stereotyping inherent in this approach, and also overcoming a
reasonable resistance to extreme dichotomies, we find it interesting
that such a distinction, if accurate, is necessarily instantiated by the
nature of the rhetorical strategies used in each culture.
We need to keep in mind Muriel Saville-Troike’s caution against
ethnocentric labeling, but Katan summarizes the contributions of
various authors and establishes an interesting set of concepts based
on the classification system described earlier (Katan, 2004).
According to this classification, an operative mode of low
contextualization places emphasis on text, facts, direct modes,
coherence, substance, rules, and monochromy. High
contextualization emphasizes context, relationships/feelings,
indirect modes, flexibility in meaning, social and personal
appearance, circumstances, and polychromy (Katan, 2004, 220).
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Katan moves on to paraphrase Hall and other authors from the
field of neuroscience who propose a relationship between two
“cultural tendencies,” the lateralization of brain function, and task
specialization in the two hemispheres (left: verbal, logical,
sequential, symbolic, temporal, linear, and detail-based skills;
right: nonverbal, spatial, musical, creative, holistic, emotional,
imaginative, pattern-based, and visualization skills) (Katan, 2004,
257). This model is too simplistic and cannot solely account for the
complexity of the processes that constitute culture and their
rhetorical instantiation at every moment and in every environment.
However, a conception of rhetoric understood not only as
“persuasive discourse,” but also as materials instantiating deep
cognitive mechanisms that connect different regions and functions
of the brain, might provide plausible explanations in this model.
These would account for differences found among languages and
cultures, not only in the Weltanschauung, or worldviews, but also
in signaling the substantially different rhetorical strategies favored
by each cultural tradition.
Empirical studies through magnetic resonance imaging that
compare brain activity in bilingual individuals in English and
Spanish seem to sustain the claim that “neural language processing
differs across their two languages” and that
[…] both monolinguals (in one language) and bilinguals
(in each language) showed predicted increases in
activation in classic language areas […], with any neural
differences between the bilingual’s two languages being
principled and predictable based on the
morphosyntactic differences between Spanish and
English […] suggesting that there may be a functional
separation of a bilingual’s two languages in one brain
based on the formal linguistic properties of each given
languages (Kovelman, Baker and Petitto, 2008,
emphasis mine).
If we view rhetorical devices as complex mechanisms stemming
from morphosyntax, it is conceivable that rhetorical differences
between languages have some sort of reciprocation with the
different cognitive or neural “mappings” that different cultures
feature or define.
In the previous sections I have attempted to lay out a
background from which several questions seem naturally to spring:
What happens with the rhetorical value of a text when this text is
translated? What happens with a text at the macro level once
micro-level structures have been accurately transported from the
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target to the source? What happens with the rhetorical value of the
target text when a mix of successful and unsuccessful micro-level
transports takes place, as is known to occur in nearly every single
piece of translation exceeding the length of a few words? Can,
perhaps, the old dialectics of “lost and found in translation” be
mapped more efficiently from an economy of rhetoric rather than
from the elusive, highly unaccountable economics of meaning?
The last question entails a significant shift from the traditional
and contemporary paradigms in translation studies, by which old
debates on translatability and untranslatability could be
approached from the scrutiny of the structural metonymic and
metaphorical choices—lexicalized landscapes—that different
languages lay out: not a mapping of morphological or syntactic
disparities, whether lexical or semantic, on the micro level or a
depiction of discursive discrepancies at the macro level, but rather a
face-to-face confrontation of rhetorical gains, losses, and
transformations. This shift may contribute to clarify the struggles of
translation with the notion of meaning, given the premise that
meaning and rhetoric go hand in hand in the construction of text.
Perhaps an account of translation’s possibilities and impossibilities
can be outlined from a systematic description of rhetorical
correspondences or their lack thereof. Perhaps a snapshot of “all
things lost in translation” can be taken too, frame by frame, with
the high-speed camera of meticulous rhetorical analysis.
Studies of metaphorical conceptualization in translating from
English into Greek have hinted at the importance of “preferred
schemata” in vertical or horizontal special relations in each
language (and therefore cultural rhetorical traditions), which
surface from the analysis of corpora of aligned translations (or
“parallel corpora”) (Sidiropoulou and Hoidas, 2014). Corpus
linguistics provides powerful tools for such analyses. Perhaps on
account of the exacting and time-consuming process of tagging
elements (often by hand) within a body of texts of sufficient and
relevant size, however, these tools in translation studies have more
frequently been applied to inquiries about lexical occurrence, cooccurrence, or frequency analyses of grammatical features.
From a less statistically based approach, Karol Hardin has
proposed an exhaustive comparative study of pragmatic strategies
within a large corpus of television advertising in Spanish, in
regional varieties from Spain, Chile, and the United States. She
employed the pragmatics of Grice, John Austin, and John Searle to
compare more than 500 advertisements for each lectal variety
(Hardin, 2001). Her pragmatic analyses are illustrative in their own
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right, but a comparison of the rhetorical structure of some of the
slogans she selects may provide further insight into the topic:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Y McDonald’s donará dinero a Ronald
McDonald House Charities (62).
Nuevos precios bajos todos los días (62).
Yo y mis psíquicos atenderán a tus problemas
(62).
Cada experiencia en el nuevo Camry te llevará
a la grandeza de sus cambios (62).
Cambia a AT&T y recibe dos entradas a un
juego de MLX (61).
Obtenga el respeto que usted se merece (89).
Miller Time. Todo puede pasar (158).
Llame a su compañía local de cable y ordene
HBO en español ahora (37).
(Hardin, 2001)

Some of the preceding examples are clearly translations of
identifiable English-language slogans: (2) New Low Prices
Everyday (HEB supermarkets and Giant supermarkets); (7) At
Miller Time anything can happen (Miller beer). Others seem to be
translations because of the frequency with which they employ
formulations characteristic of unskilled renditions, with
grammatical structures, lexical units, and turns of phrase from
English that remain apparent in the translated expression: (1)
donará dinero (‘will donate money’: frequency and idiomaticity);
(2) Nuevos precios bajos (‘new low prices’: excessive apposition of
adjectives); (3) Yo y mis psíquicos atenderán (‘I and my psychics
will assist’: subject order and subject-verb agreement); (4) cada
experiencia en (‘each experience in’: prepositional pattern); (5)
juego de MLX (‘game of MLX’: calque/false cognate); (6) respeto
(‘respect’: denotative and connotative semantic disparity); (7) Todo
puede pasar (‘anything can happen’: literalness, idiomaticity); and
(8) ordene (‘order’: false cognate).
It is evident that a significant number of these differences arise
from a less than skillful translation of advertising copy or slogans
originally in English. However, it may be more interesting to reflect
on the fact that some of these and other examples written for the
Spanish-speaking consumer in the US may be a transaction of a
different nature: not a translation of an existing text, but a
translation of “empty” (and thus “pure”) rhetorical structures; not a
matter of specific, case-by-case calque or loan translations, but of
responding to transplanted rhetorical expectations. In short, a true
translation of a rhetorical “repository of acquired formulas.” These
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would not be classified as pseudo-translations, as traditionally
defined, because there is no attempt to pass them off as translations
of a source text (Robinson, 2001); rather, they are translations of a
“rhetorical source” that in many cases does not exist as a real text.
This “rhetorical source” is nonetheless ubiquitous in advertising, as
part of discursive strategies that impregnate the production of text
in media that overflow into other languages. These are transplanted
into the target language and are completed (“fill-in-the-blanks”
like) with target-language-only words. It is not rhetorical text that is
translated here, but rhetorical structures that respond in this case
to a different tradition, as readymade truths in alien readymade
structures.
The implications of this possibility extend to the intercultural
realm, which implies, in turn, that the range of rhetorical strategies
in different languages needs to be systematically compared. The
notion of a “rhetorical map” has been proposed in order to illustrate
how translated advertising slogans undergo a profound
transformation in their rhetorical structure when they are
submitted to the rules of grammatical and textual acceptability
(Dávila-Montes, 2008, 455):

Figure 1. Comparison of Rhetorical Maps Between an Original
Advertising Piece in English and Its Official Spanish Translation
(Dávila-Montes, 2008, 455)2

My translation. Reebok U.S. website, www.reebok.com/us, accessed
12/2004.
2
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The two maps show a slightly different distribution of rhetorical
“weight and densities.” A neatly engineered array of tropes and
syntactical functions in the source text is forced through target
language grammar to a more diluted, less robust distribution of
devices in a sentence which has nearly the same length and
informational value. It would be tempting simply to conclude that
the source text displays a more complex rhetorical array that gets
“lost in translation”: more rhetorical nodes (balloons) in the source
than in the target text, higher density of rhetorical/syntactical
functions in a smaller number of lexical units—“Brand” subsumes
four operations, for example: subject, agent, theme, and
metonymy—a higher density of tropes, a more
polarized/symmetrical distribution of rhetorical “weight” (more
balloons in the source towards the beginning and the end), etc.
Conversely, the translated version shows a more interleaved and
gradual distribution of nodes throughout the length of the sentence.

Figure 2. Comparison of the “Naked” Rhetorical Maps Ensuing from
the Analysis of Source and Target Texts

These rhetorical maps may not be just an illustrative portrait of
“what is lost in one translation” at the micro-rhetorical level—what
tropes disappear, what different schemata are introduced in the
target text—but hopefully may also illustrate how the meaningmaking detail of translation needs to be more closely scrutinized
through the lens of rhetoric, as a process of “creation of meaning,”
rather than as a quest for “acceptability in deviation.” Conversely,
the analysis of what tropes stay and what tropes disappear in
translation may also contribute to hinting at the cognitive value of
particular rhetorical structures beyond their specific persuasive
value in one particular language, thus relating to differing
tolerances towards rhetoric intensity, concentration, and density.
The approach, however, of comparing rhetorical maps is not
unproblematic. As mentioned before, comparisons risk
systematically failing in several instances of “centrism,” either
cultural or determined by the Linguistics (with capital “L”) tradition
from which the analysis is being conducted.
José M. Dávila-Montes
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A useful notion may be that of “compared deviations.” While
some categories may be intrinsically non-comparable in a number
of language pairs due to profound morpho-syntactical lack of fit,
the ability to statistically measure deviations or markedness from
“general” texts in genre-limited corpora within a single language
has been proposed as a methodology to study differences between
advertising texts (Dávila-Montes, 2013). The notion of “deviation”
is not epistemologically unproblematic either (Cook, 2001, 142147), but genre-restricted deviations can be measured in specific
categories, whether syntactical or rhetorical, within different
languages. In turn, these measurements can be compared when a
degree of sufficient structural correspondence allows it (for
example, in the use of enthymemes). Thus, it is not rhetorical
devices that are being compared, but the tendency to deviate
rhetorically that one textual genre presents in two different
languages. Studies have demonstrated that advertising in Spanish,
for example, may tend to resort to metonymy and enthymemes,
that is, they tend to deviate from “neutral language,” three times
more frequently than in English, or that, in general, advertising
copy in English tends to be less inclined to rhetorical deviation than
in Spanish (Dávila-Montes, 2013, 82). By superimposing findings of
this nature on the above-mentioned “rhetorical maps,” conclusions
may be reached on what is really lost rhetorically—not as a deficit in
the transaction (how many “fewer devices” were viably
transported), but as a finalistic, bottom-line deficit: that is, the net
decrease in the ability to conform to the expectations and
“readymade” macro-textual features within specific rhetorical
tradition in the target-language culture.

Conclusion: Reciprocally Ignorant Yet Mutually
Dependent Neighbors
In this paper I have attempted to outline the rich complexity of
possible convergences between rhetoric, comparative rhetoric, and
translation studies for their own areas of intellectual inquiry. By
summarizing a limited number of theories and notions, I have
drawn up approaches through which these disciplines can crossfertilize one another and thus increase the depth and scope of many
of their premises: in translation studies by systematically
incorporating powerful terms, notions, and methodologies from
rhetoric; in rhetorical studies by including a share of inter-linguistic
relativism in its questioning of discourse and import beyond the
boundaries of a monolingual tradition.
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On a rather shallow level, it can be said that the disciplines will
indisputably benefit from a shared effort in defining themselves
within academia as “not being just a matter of words.” They would
also benefit from the claim of having a truly epistemic nature, as
has been consistently argued for rhetoric, as well as for translation
and cross-cultural studies (Ingraham, 2015; Gutiérrez, 2012). More
deeply, it seems that any growth of either discipline in some specific
direction may be significantly hindered by a secular lack of
convergence between them. Every discussion of a generalizing
nature in rhetorical studies is susceptible to deep questioning if its
values are not checked against the relativizing premises of
interlinguistic cognitivism. Conversely, most speculations in the
linguistic and discursive comparison of languages and cultures
within translation and cross-cultural studies is bound to become
entangled in, and limited by, ethnocentric scientific taxonomies,
inasmuch as the field is not furnished with a solid rhetorical
metalanguage that allows for non-culturally biased rhetorical
conceptualizations.
Copyright © 2017 José M. Dávila-Montes
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